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The fall of Viktor Yanukovych’s government in February 2014, and the subsequent Russian
annexation of Crimea and civil war in eastern Ukraine, marked the beginning of an enduring standoﬀ
between Russia and the West. Two years on, Alexander Tabachnik assesses what the legacy of
the crisis has been for Russia, Ukraine and the West.
Two years ago, after the fall of Yanukovych’s pro-Russian government and the formation of the new
pro-western government in Kyiv, Russian forces seized Crimea and instigated conﬂict in eastern
Ukraine. In response, the West imposed strict economic and political sanctions on the Russian
Federation. The purpose of this response was to force Russia to halt its occupation of Crimea and to stop Russian
support for the separatist forces in eastern Ukraine.
The sanctions against Russia consisted of sanctions against entire sectors of the Russian economy as well as
sanctions against particular members of Putin’s inner circle. From a western perspective, the sanctions were aimed
towards weakening the Russian economy and, hence, weakening Russia’s ability to manage its revisionist policy
(the status-quo policy in Ukraine from the Russian perspective) against Ukraine and potentially other republics of
the Soviet Union. They may also have been aimed at destabilising the political situation in Russia through mass
protests against the Russian leadership due to the worsening socio-economic situation. The personal sanctions
against Putin’s associates were intended to harm the business interests of Putin’s inner circle, who serve as his
primary basis for power and create divisions between Russia’s political and economic elite.
Western sanctions and Russia’s damaged economy
Two years on, what have been the lasting consequences of this policy? The sanctions, in combination with low oil
and gas prices, have caused signiﬁcant damage to the Russian economy. Russian GDP sat at 2.01 trillion US dollars
in 2013, but had fallen to only 1.23 trillion US dollars in 2015; while Russian GDP per capita dropped from 14,487
US dollars in 2013 to 8,447 US dollars in 2015. Part of this reﬂects a decrease in the exchange rate of the rouble in
relation to the dollar: in 2013 the average exchange rate was 30.03 roubles per dollar, while in 2015 the average
exchange rate was 68.73 roubles per dollar.
However, other parameters have also shown that the Russian economy has been in trouble. From 2013-15 the
inﬂation rate rose from 6.5 per cent in 2013 to 12.9 per cent in 2015; Russian exports dropped from 523 billion US
dollars in 2013 to 340 billion US dollars in 2015; Russian imports dropped from 341 billion US dollars in 2013 to 194
billion US dollars in 2015; and Russia’s international reserves dropped from 510 billion US dollars in 2013 to 368
billion US dollars in 2015. Western sanctions, in combination with low oil and gas prices, have therefore signiﬁcantly
damaged Russia’s economy, while the country’s socio-economic situation has also deteriorated during this period.
In reality, the stagnation of the Russian economy began in 2013 before the imposition of sanctions and the oil price
drop, which gives an indication of the serious structural problems now present in the Russian economy. An
additional factor which is weakening the Russian position is the technological dependence of Russia on the West,
particularly in the sphere of oil production. But while Russia is weak economically, it still possesses signiﬁcant
military power. Russia is demonstrating that it has impressive military and organisational capabilities in Ukraine and
Syria, while also highlighting that it will not hesitate to use force to promote its interests.
Russia has also demonstrated its capacity to use new forms of modern weaponry. Many western analysts and
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oﬃcials have been left surprised by Russia’s military capabilities. However, at some stage Russia’s current state of
economic weakness will also start to inﬂuence the country’s military power. Russian military spending has already
dropped from 88.4 billion US dollars in 2013 to 66.4 billion dollars in 2015 – a signiﬁcant decrease of about 25 per
cent during these two years.
Moreover, Russia has been burdened by a number of additional expenses. Russia will have to provide economic
resources for those parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are controlled by pro-Russian militants.
Additionally, Russia is providing signiﬁcant economic support for Crimea, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria.
According to Stratfor, Russia is spending at least 5 billion dollars per year on these causes and this spending is
expected to rise. With time, the pressure of these expenses on the country’s budget will increase.
Putin’s grip on power
Despite the economic impact of the West’s sanctions, eﬀorts aimed at fostering domestic opposition to the Russian
government have been far less successful. There have not been any meaningful anti-government protests in the
country and a signiﬁcant proportion of the population continues to support Vladimir Putin and his foreign policy. The
West, rather than the government, has tended to take the blame for the diﬃcult economic situation. Survey evidence
suggests a signiﬁcant part of the Russian population places greater emphasis on the country having a high level of
status in comparison to the United States than they do on their economic wellbeing in the short-term. In the medium
and long-term, however, this may change.
Source: Pew Research Centre, Spring 2015
Putin has nevertheless undertaken measures to
strengthen his regime in order to neutralise potential
unrest, such as the recent formation of the Russian
National Guard, which is symbolic of a general
redistribution of control within Russia’s security
structures. The leading roles in this new formation have
been given to people who are personally loyal to Putin
and have worked with him for many years. Indeed, the
new National Guard will be under the personal control of
Putin. As such, a signiﬁcant weakening of Putin’s regime
is unlikely in the near term, especially taking into account
the political and organisational weakness of the
opposition and civic society.
At present, no real democratic alternative to Putin’s
regime exists in Russia. There are no strong democratic
leaders or structures which can be supported by a
signiﬁcant part of the Russian population. Moreover, the
ideals of western-style liberal democracy have been
discredited in Russia following the unsuccessful
democratic reforms of the 90s. Thus, the notion of
establishing a liberal-democratic regime as a
replacement for Putin’s regime is highly problematic.
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Source: Pew Research Centre, Spring 2015
But this does not mean that Russia cannot be successfully contained in Ukraine through economic and political
sanctions. The sanctions are working and, while Russia will not withdraw from Crimea, a compromise is feasible in
eastern Ukraine, as illustrated by the Second Minsk agreement. At least on paper, Russia has indicated that it
supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity, with the exception of Crimea, through the federalisation of the country – or at
least the provision of a special status for Donetsk and Luhansk. From Russia’s perspective, the federalisation of
Ukraine will prevent its integration into the EU and Nato, counterbalancing western inﬂuence.
The West and Ukraine
In practice, Ukraine has little prospect of being accepted into the EU or Nato in the near future. The recent
referendum in the Netherlands demonstrates that a signiﬁcant percentage of western Europeans are not ready to
support such close links with Ukraine. And it would be particularly diﬃcult to explain to European taxpayers why they
should support the accession of Ukraine, which remains a poor country with signiﬁcant corruption problems,
damaged infrastructure, and a notably diﬀerent culture. All of these factors may potentially undermine the belief of
the Ukrainian population in pursuing a pro-western course.
The best thing the West could do for Ukraine would be to provide tangible assistance for statebuilding eﬀorts in the
country. The formation of an eﬀective Ukrainian bureaucracy and an active civil society should be key priorities, as
should the ongoing ﬁght against corruption. These elements are the foundation for political stability in Ukraine and
this is the best protection against Russian revisionism.
And if the West wishes to inﬂuence Russian public opinion then this can be achieved by setting an example in
Ukraine. This process may take years of political and economic eﬀorts from the West, but it nevertheless oﬀers the
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best route forward. A stable and relatively well-developed Ukraine could ultimately be accepted into the EU –
although the prospect of Nato membership should, in all likelihood, be dropped permanently as it is likely to be the
source of enduring tensions between the West and Russia moving forward.
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